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Davis v. Michigan and the Doctrine of Retroactivity: 
States' Refund Liability for Taxation of Federal 
Pension Income 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury/ the Supreme 
Court invalidated a Michigan tax statute which treated state and fed-
eral employees' pensions differently. The Court held that the tax dis-
criminated against federal employees by only providing them with a 
limited exemption, rather than the full exemption which state employ-
ees enjoyed.2 The decision in Davis will affect as many as twenty-four 
states,3 all of which give more favorable treatment to state employees' 
pensions. 
One of the most significant issues faced by these states is whether 
federal employees are entitled to a refund of taxes paid under tax 
schemes similar to the pension tax invalidated in Davis. If the effect of 
Davis is limited to the litigants in the case and to those whose actions 
accrued after the decision, then the decision applies prospectively, and 
refunds to federal employees would be limited to pension taxes paid 
after the decision in Davis was announced. If, however, the decision is 
also applied to past conduct, then the decision operates retroactively, 
and all pension taxes paid by federal employees would have to be re-
funded, even those paid before Davis was decided. If required to refund 
past taxes to federal employees, states affected by Davis would have to 
pay between $7.4 million and $370 million.'' The resolution of this is-
sue depends both on state refund statutes and on whether Davis will be 
given a retroactive effect. 
Part II of this note briefly examines the refund issue in the context 
of the lower courts' and the Supreme Court's decisions. Part III dis-
cusses the authority of state courts to limit the retroactive effect of a 
1. 109 S. Ct. 1500 (1989). 
2. The statute in question exempted all of a state employee's pension benefits from taxation, 
but only the first $7,500 of a federal employee's pension benefits on a single rNurn, or $10,000 on 
a joint return. MICH. CoMP. LAWS. ANN. § 206.30(1)(0 (West Supp. 1988). 
3. C. EcKL, J. FELDE, S. WoLFE & C. ZIMMERMAN, Prrfacr to STATE TAXATION OF PuB-
LIC PENSIONS: THE IMPACT OF Dm•is 1'. Michigan (National Conference of State Legislatures, 
Legislative Finance Paper No. 70). 
4. C. EcKL, J. FELDE, S. WoLFE, & C. ZIMMERMAN, STATE TAXATION oF PuBLIC PEN-
SIONS: THE IMPACT OF Dfwis 1'. Michigan 11-18 (National Conference of State Legislatures, 
Legislative Finance Paper No. 70) [hereinafter IMPACT]. 
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decision and the applicability of state refund statutes. Finally, part IV 
looks at the probable treatment of the retroactivity issue raised by 
Davis. 
II. THE REFUND IssuE IN THE CoNTEXT oF THE LowER 
CouRTs' AND THE SuPREME CouRT's DECISIONS 
Davis, a former employee of the United States Government, peti-
tioned for a refund of state taxes paid on his civil service pension bene-
fits for the previous five years. 5 After being denied relief, he filed suit 
in the Michigan claims court, alleging that "the State's inconsistent 
treatment of state and federal retirement benefits discriminated against 
federal retirees in violation of 4 U.S.C. § 111."6 The claims court de-
nied relief, and the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed.7 The United 
States Supreme Court reversed the state courts, holding that pension 
benefits fell squarely within the meaning of section 111 as "compensa-
tion for services rendered 'as an officer or employee of the United 
States,' " 8 and that the tax unconstitutionally discriminated against fed-
eral employees. 9 
In determining the appropriate remedy, the Court recognized that 
the appellant was entitled to prospective relief from discriminatory tax-
ation, but it declined to order how this should be accomplished. Equal 
treatment could be achieved " 'by withdrawal of benefits from the fa-
vored class [or] extension of benefits to the excluded class,' " 10 a deci-
sion which Michigan state courts were in a better position to decide. 11 
The Court also declined to decide whether tax refunds for past discrim-
ination were required, since the state conceded to giving a refund. 12 
Although the appropriateness of tax refunds did not arise in either 
the state courts13 or the Supreme Court, refund cases resulting from 
Davis have required state courts to resolve this issue. Thus, states will 
need to determine what role they will play in deciding whether a re-
fund should be given. 
5. 109 S. Ct. at 1503. 
6. Id. The Public Salary Tax Act of 1939, of which 4 U.S.C. § Ill is part, prohibits dis-
criminatory taxation of federal employees by states. !d. at 1503-04. 
7. The Michigan Supreme Court denied appellant's application for leave to appeal. Davis v. 
Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 429 Mich. 854, 412 N.W.2d 220 (1987). 
8. Dm•is, 109 S. Ct. at 1504 (citing 4 U.S.C. § Ill (1982)). 
9. !d. at 1508. 
10. Id. at 1509 (citing Heckler v. Matthews, 465 U.S. 728, 740 (1984)). 
II. !d. 
12. !d. at 1508-09. 
13. The issue of tax refunds did not arise in either the Michigan Court of Claims or the 
Court of Appeals of Michigan, since both courts held the tax on federal pensions valid. 
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The primary issues pertinent to a refund determination are the 
extent of state authority to limit the retroactivity of an overruling deci-
sion, and what role a state refund statute (when one exists) should have 
in the determination of whether to refund taxes paid pursuant to a tax 
scheme invalidated by the Supreme Court. 
Three cases have addressed the refund question raised by Davis. 
Federal district courts decided Todd v. Johnson 14 and MPlofv. Hunt, 11" 
while the Missouri Supreme Court dealt with the refund issue in 
Hackman v. Dirf'Ctor of Revenue. 16 In Hackman, the court decided to 
follow a state refund statute in holding that a federal retiree was enti-
tled to a refund. 17 The two federal cases were both dismissed on the 
basis of the Tax Injunction Act/8 which requires federal courts to defer 
to states any injunction, levy, or assessment of taxes under state law 
when a "plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of 
such State."19 Thus, all refund battles must be fought in state courts. 
A. Stat£' Authority to Define Limits of Adhnmcf to PrPadent 
The authority of states to define "limits of adherence to precedent" 
was recognized by the Supreme Court long ago in Great Northern 
Railway v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co. 20 There, the Court recog-
nized that states have an unlimited right to give a prospective effect to a 
decision. 21 More recently, the Court determined that it should not be 
the body to decide the retrospective effect of its decisions in the "com-
plex area of state tax structures" due to the possible relevance of state 
law on the subject. 22 
However, part of the Court's reluctance to decide whether a re-
fund is required in cases involving invalid state taxes stems from the 
14. 718 F. Supp. 1305 (S.D. Miss. 1989). 
15. 718 F. Supp. 877 (M.D Ala. 1989). 
16. 771 S.W.2d 77 (Mo. 1989) (en bane). 
17. /d. at 81. Srr mfm notes 62-69 and accompanying text. 
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). 
19. /d. 
20. 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932); Sff also Loeb v. Columbia Township Trustees, 179 U.S. 472, 
492 (1900); Douglass v. County of Pike, 101 U.S. 677, 687 (1879); Gelpcke v. Citv of Dubuque, 
68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175, 206 (1863). 
21. Sunburst, 287 U.S. at 364 ("A state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent may 
make a choice for itself between the principle of forward operation and that of relation 
backward."). 
22. Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 252 (1987); rmord 
Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 28 (1985); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 
(1984) 
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lack of opportunity the state courts in those cases had to address the 
issue of refunds. 23 Whatever bounds there are on the power to limit 
retroactivity should be revealed in the 1990 term when the Court ad-
dresses two cases in which the state courts have fully addressed the 
refund issue: American Trucking Association ·u. Cray24 and Diz,ision of 
Alcoholic Beverages v. McKPsson Corp. 2 ~ 
B. The RolP of State Refund Statutes 
Although state courts have the authority to determine whether to 
apply a decision retroactively, many states have statutes directing the 
refund of taxes when the underlying tax scheme is unconstitutional. 
Courts that have a state refund statute have been more than willing to 
follow the statute rather than deal with the issue of retroactivity. 26 For 
example, in Hackman, the state urged the court to address the issue of 
limiting retroactivity, contending that Davis should be given only pro-
spective effect. 27 The court, though, stated that as long as the proce-
dural requirements of the state refund statute were met, the party was 
entitled to a refund, and hence, the retroactivity issue did not need to be 
reached.28 
However, the Washington Supreme Court in National Can Corp. 
v. Department of Revenue29 held just the opposite. There, the court 
had previously upheld Washington's multiple activities exemption to a 
business and occupation tax. The United States Supreme Court held 
this tax invalid in Tyler Pipe Industries v. Washington Department of 
Revenue.30 On remand, the taxpayers sued for a refund. The court first 
23. For example, both Tylrr and Bacchus involved cases where the stale courts had not ad-
dressed the refund issue. In Ty/rr, the case had been dismissed on the pleadings in the state courts. 
483 U.S. at 252-53. Likewise, the Hawaii Supreme Court in Baahus upheld a liquor tax and 
thus did not need to address a refund issue. 468 U.S. at 265, 267. 
24. 295 Ark. 43, 746 S.W.2d 377 (1988) (invalidating tax and applying prospective effect to 
decision, therefore denying refunds), art. r;rantPd, 109 S. Ct. 389 ( 198!:1), rPstortd to calmdnfor 
rPargu!lltnt, 109 S. Ct. 3238 (1989). 
25. 524 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1988) (upholding trial court's decision to give prospective effect to 
decision holding tax unconstitutional), art. r;rantPd, 109 S. Ct. 389 (1988), rf.l!orerl to calmdrr 
for rm rgu!llmt, I 09 S. Ct. 3238 ( 1989). 
26. See, e.g., First Nat'! Bank v. Commonwealth, 520 Pa. 244, 253-55, 551 A.2d 937, 942-
43 (1989) (holding that taxpayer had immediate, legal right to refund pursuant to refund statute, 
as long as requirements of statute were met); Hackman v. Director of Revenue, 771 S.W.2d 77, 
80 (Mo. 1989) (en bane) ("'If this state's tax refund statutes. . apply, then all other issues are 
irrelevant.'" (citing National Can Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 109 Wash. 2d 878, 880, 749 
P2d, 1286, 1287 (1988)). 
27. 771 S.W.2d at 80. 
28. /d. at 81. 
29. 109 Wash. 2d 878, 749 P.2d 1286 (1988) (en hanc). 
30. 483 u.s. 232 ( 1987). 
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noted that Washington had a tax refund statute, but then reasoned that 
it could reach the statute only after it determined whether Tyler was to 
have a prospective or retroactive effect: "[I]f the court finds the Tyler 
holding is to be applied only prospectively, then for the purposes of 
applying the refund statutes it is as if the taxes collected pre-Tyler were 
constitutionally collected."31 The court reasoned that since Washington 
case law does not support the mandating of tax refunds when a tax is 
found to be unconstitutional, it could apply a prospectivity test to deter-
mine whether there should be a refund. 32 
The National Can decision appears to have a logical, directly con-
trary conclusion to Hackman. However, the Washington court ignores 
the very purpose of the state's tax refund statute. In effect, the court 
renders the statute meaningless, since it can determine by "Washington 
case law"33 whether a refund should be given at all. But once the legis-
lature has spoken, courts have a duty to apply the statute. They may 
interpret the statute and evaluate its constitutionality, but they cannot 
ignore the legislature without having invalidated the statute. The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court's statement in First National Bank v. Com-
monwealth34 regarding the application of their refund statute is disposi-
tive of this issue: 
The authority within the judiciary to determine the reach of its deci-
sions does not however preclude the legislature from independently 
providing persons with legal rights as a result of judicial pronounce-
ments. Where a litigant's right to some legal remedy may be derived 
from statute, it would be a meaningless exercise for a court to deter-
mine whether an identical right is vested in the litigant as a result of 
prior decisional law. 3~ 
Therefore, although state courts do have authority to limit the retro-
active effect of an overruling decision, Hackman represents the better 
position that when a state statute directs the action to be taken upon a 
tax being declared unconstitutional, the statute should be followed, and 
the retroactivity and prospectivity issues need not be reached. 
IV. PROBABLE TREATMENT oF THE RETROACTIVITY IssuE 
RAISED BY Davis 
When a state refund statute is not available, the prospective or 
retroactive effect of Dm1is will need to be determined by courts to de-
31. 109 Wash. 2d at 880-81, 749 P.2d at 1287. 
32. !d. 
33. !d. 
34. 520 Pa. 244, 553 A.2d 937 (1989). 
35. !d. at 253, 553 A.2d at 941. 
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cide the refund issue. The general rule is that "judicial decisions ordi-
narily operate retroactively."36 However, the United States Supreme 
Court has " 'recognized the doctrine of nonretroactivity outside the 
criminal area many times, in both constitutional and nonconstitutional 
cases.' " 37 For example, in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 38 the Court de-
veloped a test for determining the prospectivity of its decisions. 39 
Although the ultimate resolution of the refund issue will likely de-
pend on the test derived in Chevron, the Court hinted in Davis that the 
refund issue could be decided solely on the basis of precedent when it 
cited Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. Bennett40 in support of issu-
ing a refund. 41 This section will first discuss the Chevron test, and will 
then consider the impact of Bennett on the refund Issue. 
A. The Chevron Test 
The prospectivity test put forth in Chevron is really a synthesis of 
principles in previous cases which have recognized exceptions to the 
general retroactivity rule. The test consists of three factors: ( 1) the deci-
sion "must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear 
past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an 
issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshad-
owed;"42 (2) the Court must "'weigh the merits and demerits in each 
case by looking to the prior history of the rule ... , its purpose and 
effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its op-
eration;' " 43 and (3) "the inequity imposed by retroactive application 
must be weighed"44 (that is, when a decision would produce "substan-
36. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Rose, 350 S.E.2d 531, 534 (W.Va. 1986). 
37. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 197 (1973) (citing Chevron Oil Co. V Huson, 404 
U.S. 97, 106 (1971)). 
38. 404 U.S. 97 (1971). ChP1•ron involved a suit for personal injuries sustained in an offshore 
drilling rig near Louisiana. While pretrial discovery was proceeding, the Supreme Court in an 
unrelated case, Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969), ruled that the 
admiralty doctrine of laches (which had up until that time governed actions such as plaintiff's) no 
longer applied to injuries occurring offshore on the Continental Shelf. Based on this ruling, the 
district court in Chr1•ron held that Louisiana's one-year statute of limitations on personal injury 
actions applied and concluded that normal retroactive effect of Hodrir;111' barred plaintiff's suit, 
since he did not discover the seriousness of his injuries until more than two years following the 
accident. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that Hodrir;ur would only be applied prospectively, 
and that actions accruing prior to Hodrigup would still be governed by the admiralty laches 
doctrine. 
39. Srr infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text. 
40. 284 U.S. 239 (1931). 
41. 109 S. Ct. at 1509. 
42. 404 U.S. at 106 (citations omitted). 
43. !d. at 106-07 (citing Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965)). 
44. Irl. at 107. 
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tial inequitable results if applied retroactively," a holding of prospectiv-
ity is justified411 ). This test46 has been widely used by state courts in 
dealing with the refund of taxes paid pursuant to an unconstitutional 
scheme.47 
1. N l'W principle of law 
The first prong of the test, the "new rule of law" requirement, is 
satisfied by deciding "an issue of first impression whose resolution was 
not clearly foreshadowed."48 Prior to Davis, states exempted state, but 
not federal, employees' pension income from taxation based on the as-
sumption that as long as federal workers were treated at least as favqr-
ably as private sector retirees, they were not in violation of federal 
law!9 The ruling in Davis "took most state officials by surprise" since 
they had enacted such provisions "[f]or half a century after the passage 
of the Public Salary Tax Act."110 The Davis ruling, then, seems to sat-
isfy the first prong of the test. 111 
However, the Court in Davis identified a previous case that dealt 
with a similar tax in which both lessees of federal property and lessees 
of private property were taxed at the same rate, but lessees of state 
property paid a lesser tax. 112 The Court invalidated the tax, concluding 
the tax unconstitutionally discriminated against the federal government 
and its lessee. 113 Thus, a contender for a refund could assert that the 
Davis decision requiring equal pension tax treatment of federal and 
state employees may have been foreshadowed. But one case in the last 
45. !d. (citing Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969)). 
46. Whether all three factors of the test must always be satisfied for a court to apply a 
decision prospectively is not clear. Sff Arizona Governing Comm'n v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1109 
(1983) (O'Connor, ]., concurring), construfd in First of McAlester Corp. v. Oklahoma Tax 
Comm'n, 709 P.2d 1026, 1034-35 (Okla. 1985). 
47. E.g., Elgin v. Great W. Life Assurance Co., 163 Ariz. 176, 786 P.2d 1027 (Ct. App. 
1989); American Trucking Ass'n v. Gray, 295 Ark. 43, 746 S.W.2d 377 (Ark. 1988); Sumners v. 
Sumners, 701 S.W.2d 720 (Mo. 1985), construfd in Hackman v. Director of Revenue, 771 
S.W.2d 77, 86-87 (Mo. 1989) (Welliver, ]., dissenting); First of McAlester Corp. v. Oklahoma 
Tax Comm'n, 709 P.2d 1026 (Okla. 1985); National Can Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 109 
Wash. 2d 878,749 P.2d 1286 (1988); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Rose, 350 S.E.2d 531, 534 n.6 (W.Va. 
1986); Burlington N. v. City of Superior, 149 Wis. 2d 190,441 N.W. 2d 234 (Ct. App. 1989); cf 
Automobile Trade Ass'n v. City of Philadelphia, 109 Pa. Commw. 524, 531 A.2d 573 (1987) 
(relying on Lnnon and Cipriano). 
48. 404 U.S. at 106. 
49. IMPACT, supra note 4, at 5. 
50. !d. 
51. Sff Hackman v. Director of Revenue, 771 S.W.2d 77, 86 (Mo. 1989) (Welliver, J., 
dissenting). 
52. 109 S. Ct. at 1507 n.4 (construing Phillips Chern. Co. v. Dumas Indep. School Dist., 361 
U.S. 376, 381 (1960)). 
53. !d. at 1507. 
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fifty years, being decided over twenty years ago, may not hold much 
weight in trying to prove that Davis was foreshadowed. This is a slight 
chance at best; the stronger argument appears to support the proposi-
tion that Davis established a new principle of law. 
2. Retrospectivity: whether it furthers operation of the new law 
The second prong of the test focuses on the practicality of imple-
menting the new rule of law through retroactive operation. The pur-
pose of the new law announced in Davis is " 'a mandate of equal treat-
ment' " for both state and federal employees' pension taxes. 64 So the 
appropriate inquiry under this prong of the test is whether retroactive 
operation of Davis will further or hinder equal treatment of state and 
federal employees. Although the Court stated that this could be accom-
plished either by a withdrawal of the exemption from retired state em-
ployees or by an extension of the exemption to federal retirees, the 
Court chose to defer the remedy to the Michigan courts. 
If Davis is applied retroactively, the impact of providing refunds 
will be to require states to appropriate significant sums of money. 55 
Thus, the fiscal impact of providing refunds could be a significant fac-
tor as states consider whether to extend the benefit to federal employees 
or withdraw the exemption from state pensioners. States with relatively 
high refund costs may be reluctant to withdraw benefits from state em-
ployees to help pay for the refund. 
Although the political consequences of withdrawing the exemption 
from state employees may serve to slow the actions of state legislatures, 
states' reactions have been just the opposite. As of August 1989, thir-
teen of the twenty-four states56 have already taken legislative action to 
comply with Davis, while three states called special sessions for Fall 
1989. Four more states will address the issue in the 1990 legislative 
sessions. 57 
Though the possibility of a retroactive application apparently has 
not hindered the mandate of equal treatment for state and federal re-
54. /d. at 1509 (citing Heckler v. Matthews, 465 U.S. 728, 740 (1984)). 
55. Sre supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
56. Sre supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
57. IMPACT, supra note 4, at 10-11. The states that have acted are Arizona, Colorado, Iowa, 
Missouri, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Vir-
ginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. /d. at 10. Most of these states have chosen to repeal prefer-
ences for state pension income. /d. at 27, Table 4. Georgia, Utah, and Michigan called special 
sessions for Fall 1989. /d. at 10. Utah repealed the exemption for state employees, but mitigated 
the impact by increasing retirement benefits and by providing a $7500 tax deduction for all pen-
sion income. Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, and New Mexico will consider the refund and 
exemption issues in 1990. /d. at 11-15. 
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tired employees, neither will it further equal treatment. Curing the dis-
criminatory tax requires legislative action, not refunds for past discrim-
ination. This prong of the test, therefore, is neutral, which should give 
the first and third prongs more weight in determining the outcome. 
3. The avoidance of injustice or hardship 
The third prong of Chevron consists of "weighing the equities be-
tween retroactive and prospective application" of Davis. 58 The degree 
to which retroactivity would impose "substantial, inequitable results"59 
is a fact-specific inquiry for the particular state involved. For example, 
Colorado estimates that its total refund cost, if refunds are required, 
will be $7.4 million over a three-year period. 60 On the other end of the 
spectrum is Virginia, which could pay up to $370 million over three 
years. 61 
Addressing this issue, the Hackman court followed the state re-
fund statute and allowed the refund. The court rejected the state's ar-
gument that it could not make refunds which could cost over $150 mil-
lion when no money had yet been appropriated by the legislature.62 
The court determined that whether the state had appropriated the nec-
essary funds "is not relevant to our consideration of the merits of appel-
lants' claims."63 However, this case is not dispositive in jurisdictions 
which do not have refund statutes. The Missouri court did not have to 
apply a prospectivity test, and their only dealing with the magnitude of 
the refund was whether the money had been appropriated. 
But the dissent in Hackman concluded that if the Chevron test did 
need to be applied, the equities weighed in favor of prospectivity.64 
Judge Welliver balanced the benefit of a refund to "a select group of 
taxpayers" versus the burden placed upon all taxpayers in having to 
give priority to the refund rather than needed services such as educa-
tion, health, and law enforcement.611 He concluded that since the taxes 
were not "illegally assessed,"66 and since the refund "will not add any-
thing to the implementation of [Davis]," the benefits of the refund did 
58. Hackman v. Director of Revenue, 771 S.W.2d 77, 86 (Mo. 1989) (Welliver, J., 
dissenting). 
59. Chn•ron, 404 U.S. at 107 (citing Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 US. 701, 706 (1969). 
60. IMPACT, supra note 4 at 12. 
61. !d. at 18. 
62. Harkman, 771 S.W.2d at 82. 
63. !d. 
64. !d. at 86-87 (Welliver, J., dissenting). 
65. !d. 
66. !d. "These taxes were legal in all of the ... states involved until the Court's announce-
ment of the new principle of law in Dm•is." !d. at 88. 
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not justify retroactive treatment.67 
It is not clear, though, that a refund in Hackman would require 
the sacrificing of other services as Judge Welliver contends. The court 
noted that over $228 million had been generally appropriated for re-
funding overpayment of taxes, which may include those required by 
Davis.68 Considering the fact that the appropriation was open-ended,69 
and that the Davis refund would cost approximately $160 million,70 
there appears to be enough money to handle the refund without forego-
ing other services. Therefore, it is difficult to use this case as a measure 
of what other courts may decide. The third prong of the test will thus 
remain an issue to be decided by each court as it is encountered. 
B. The Implications of Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. Bennett 
Although an analysis of the Chevron test seems to favor prospec-
tive application of Davis, the Court's reference in Davis to Bennett71 
may provide a quick, simple answer favoring retroactivity. Bennett in-
volved a tax on the shares of a national bank's stock at greater rates 
than were applied to shares of competing domestic corporations.72 The 
tax itself was not discriminatory-it applied the same rates to both na-
tional bank stock and domestic corporate stock. The inequity resulted 
from an inaccurate assessment by the county auditor, resulting in a 
lower assessment on the domestic corporations. 73 The Supreme Court 
held that petitioners had a right to equal treatment, and whether the 
state still had power to equalize treatment by compelling the domestic 
corporations to pay the higher rate was immaterial. 74 "[I]t is well set-
tled that a taxpayer who has been subjected to discriminatory taxation 
through the favoring of others in violation of federal law, cannot be 
required himself to assume the burden of seeking an increase of the 
taxes which the others should have paid."711 What the Court did here is 
only one step more than it did in Davis; it determined that its decision 
should have retroactive application. As in Davis, the Court declined to 
devise the remedy which the state should follow in the future (with-
drawing or extending the benefit). By referring to Bennett in support of 
the state's conclusion that Davis should receive a refund, the Court in 
67. !d. 
68. 771 S.W.2d at 82 n.4. 
69. !d. 
70. IMPACT, supra note 4, at 15. 
71. 284 U.S. 239 (1931) 
72. !d. at 241. 
73. !d. at 241-42. 
74. !d. at 247. 
75. !d. 
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Davis implied that this would be the appropriate course for all federal 
retirees in the same situation as Davis. 
The application of Bennett to the Davis decision, though, is not 
without its problems. First, the Bennett tax was not unconstitutional. A 
mere clerical error caused the disparate treatment between the bank 
and the domestic corporations. Second, there were only two banks 
which had been harmed by the error, and only one state was involved. 
In Davis, there are over 1.3 million federal retirees across twenty-four 
states who have been treated unequally.76 True, the net effect was une-
qual tax treatment in both cases. However, applying Bennett to the 
Davis decision would ignore the more recent precedents in Tyler and 
Bacchus77 that defer to states the refund determination. At best, Ern-
nett may provide support for a ruling of retroactivity derived from ap-
plying the Chevron test, but it should not be given much precedential 
effect on its own. 
V. CoNCLUSION 
Barring the existence of state refund statutes, the Cht>vron criteria 
provide the framework from which to attack the refund issue. Davis 
clearly seems to be a new rule of law, with broad implications both in 
terms of the number of states it affects and in the magnitude of its 
impact. Because retroactive treatment of Davis will neither further nor 
retard the mandate of equal treatment, the second prong of the Chf't'-
ron test does not shed any light on the prospectivity analysis. Hence, 
the third factor of the test will weigh most heavily in determining 
whether to give a refund, and will provide the focus of the majority of 
litigation that states will face. Further, the authority of the BmnPtl 
decision should be limited to more of a support role in the event of a 
ruling for retroactivity, not as a case which could stand on its own to 
support retrospective treatment of Davis. 
Timoth_'V B. Shnman 
76. IMPACT, supra note 4, at 25-26. 
77. Sn supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. 
